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The Scope of Collective Bargaining in Public
Education Under The Pennsylvania Public
Employe Relations Act
The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold
two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still




The enactment in 1970 of the Pennsylvania Public Employe Rela-
tions Act,' popularly known as Act 195,2 signalled the beginning of
a new age in the field of public sector collective bargaining in Penn-
sylvania. While the stated legislative intent in enacting the Penn-
sylvania Public Employe Act was to provide for the orderly and
peaceful settlement of labor disputes in the public sector by means
of collective bargaining,3 mediation4 and arbitration,5 and establish-
ment of a limited right to strike,' the intent-as to what subjects
are within the scope of collective bargaining'-was, and remains to
a great extent, uncertain. While the title of Act 195 refers to defining
the "scope of collective bargaining,"' the text of the Act seems to
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Supp. 1975).
2. The popular name is derived from the Act's order of passage as Act of July 23, 1970,
No. 195, 119701 Laws of Pa. 563.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Supp. 1975). The term "collective bargaining" is
used here to describe the process of establishing terms and conditions of employment in a
written agreement negotiated between the public employer and a union acting as exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. The term is not specifically defined
in either Act 195 or in the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.1-
.13 (1964).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801 (Supp. 1975).
5. Id. §§ 1101.804-.805.
6. Id. § 1101.1003. See Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School
Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 271 (Pa. 1975) (Pomeroy, J., coricurring).
7. The "scope of collective bargaining" usually refers to the range of issues included in
negotiations between the parties to a labor agreement. Gerhart, The Scope of Bargaining in
Local Government Labor Negotiations, 20 LAB. L.J. 545 (1969).
8. The title of Act 195 reads in part: "An Act establishing rights in public employes to
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speak with two, apparently conflicting, voices: what the legislature
has specifically made bargainable and what the legislature has also
specifically allowed management to reserve to its unilateral
decision-making. 0 This conflict has appeared most dramatically in
the field of public education. While Act 195 covers most state and
local public employees," the center stage has been occupied by
public education, where the relationship between school boards
and teacher associations has, in many instances, been anything but
"orderly and constructive"' 2 since the passage of Act 195.' 3 Not only
did the first test of the efficacy of the Act occur in public educa-
tion, 4 but the most significant case law and nearly a majority of the
administrative decisions that have been handed down interpreting
that Act have centered upon the field of public education.
It is the aim of this comment to examine, in the context of public
education in Pennsylvania, the conflicting perspectives of teacher
associations and school boards'" on the scope of collective bargain-
organize and bargain collectively through selected representatives; . . . defining the scope of
collective bargaining .... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1975).
9. See id. § 1101.701. For the text of this statute see text accompanying note 58 infra.
10. See id. § 1101.702. For the text of this statute see text accompanying note 60 infra.
11. Id. § 1101.301(2) provides in relevant part:
"Public employe" . . . means any individual employed by a public employer but
shall not include elected officials, appointees of the Governor with the advice and
consent of the Senate as required by law, management level employes, confidential
employes, clergymen or other persons in a religious profession. . . and those employes
covered under the act of June 24, 1968 (Act No. 111), entitled "An act specifically
authorizing collective bargaining between police and firemen and their public employ-
ers .. ..
12. The phrase is taken from the stated "public policy" of Act 195, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1975), which reads in part: "[I]t is the public policy of this Common-
wealth and the purpose of this act to promote orderly and constructive relationships between
all public employers and their employes .... "
13. For example, in the three year period from October 1970 (the effective date of the Act)
to November 1973, there were a total of 159 public school strikes in Pennsylvania, mostly by
teachers. Alderfer, Follow-up on the Pennsylvania Public School Strikes, 25 LAB. L.J. 161
(1974). For an examination of the effect of these strikes, see Alderfer, id.; Alderfer, Teachers
Hold Record in Pennsylvania Strikes, NAT'L Civic REV. 368-71 (1973); Alderfer, The 1971
Pennsylvania Public School Strikes, 23 LAB. L.J. 41-50 (1972). See also PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL
BOARDS ASSOCIATION, XI INFORMATION LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, Feb. 2, 1973, at 1-9; PENNSYLVANIA
STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH APPENDIX, May 17, 1973, at 1-21.
14. This first test involved the January 1971 Pittsburgh teachers' strike. For an analysis
of Act 195's application to this dispute, see Comment, The Public Employe Relations Act
and Pennsylvania Teachers: A Legal Analysis in Light of the January, 1971 Pittsburgh
Dispute, 10 DuQ. L. REV. 77 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Public Employe
Relations Actf.
15. Althoogh the Public School Code of 1949 uses the phrase "board of school directors,"
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ing'6 and to analyze the development of case law and administrative
decisions pertaining to the scope of that bargaining under Act 195,
in order to provide some guidance as to future developments in this
area of public sector labor law.
Any examination into this unique and often stormy area of public
labor relations must begin with an understanding of the circum-
stances that existed prior to passage of Act 195, in order to under-
stand the "mischief sought to be remedied"" by its enactment.
II. PRE-ACT 195
The growth of public employment in the post-World War II era'"
was accompanied by a surge of public employee union organization 9
see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3-301 (1962), the author has used the term "school board"
throughout this comment for the sake of clarity to the reader.
16. In the field of education, the expression "professional negotiations" is often substi-
tuted for the term "collective bargaining." The terms are synonymous. The former term
merely connotes that employees of professional standing are participating and does not con-
vey a fundamentally different meaning than does collective bargaining. See Seitz, Legal
Aspects of Public School Teacher Negotiating and Participating in Concerted Activities, 49
MARQ. L. REV. 487, 488 (1966). See also GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE 91:03. Although
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(7) (Supp. 1975) provides a separate definition for
"professional employe," no distinction is drawn under the law (Act 195) or in practice be-
tween "professional employes" and other public sector employee groups with respect to the
scope of collective bargaining.
For an excellent discussion of salaried professionals, their aspirations, and their effect on
the scope of public sector bargaining, see Kleingartner, Impact of Professionalism on Scope
of Bargaining in the Public Sector, in SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR-CONCEPTS
AND PROBLEMS (P. Prasow ed. 1972).
17. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 337 A.2d 262,
266 (Pa. 1975).
18. The growth of public employment is indicated in chart 1, page 430 infra.
For an analysis of the burgeoning of public employee unionism in this period, see Gitlow,
Public Employee Unionism in the United States: Growth and Outlook, 21 LAB. L.J. 766 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Gitlowl; Petro, Sovereignty & Compulsory Public Sector Bargaining,
10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25-37 (1974).
19. The growth of public, employee union organization is indicated in chart 2, page 430
infra.
On the topic of public employee organization, see Gitlow, supra note 18; Jones, Union
Militancy of Nation's 10.5 Million Public Employees Is Found Increasing, N.Y. Times, April
2, 1967, at 79, col. 1; Posey, The New Militancy of Public Employees, 28 PUB. AD. REV. 111
(1968). The most dramatic public employee organizational drive and growth occurred in the
field of public education. See Hight, Teachers, Bargaining, and Strikes: Perspective from the
Swedish Experience, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 840, 842 (1968).
On the general history of the significant developments, statutory enactments, court deci-
sions and organizational activities in the teachers' drive to achieve collective negotiations,
see D. WOLLETr & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS (1970).
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Chart 1 - Growth of Public Employment
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
YEAR TOTAL NUMBER OF CIVILIANS FEDERAL STATE AND TOTAL PERCENTAGE
EMPLOYED IN THE (CIVILIAN) LOCAL OF TOTAL
UNITED STATES EMPLOYEES
1950 58,918,000 2,117,000 4,285,000 6,402,000 11%
1955 62,170,000 2,378,000 5,054,000 7,432,000 12%
1960 65,778,000 2,421,000 6,387,000 8,808,000 14%
1965 71,088,000 2,588,000 8,001,000 10,589,000 15%
1970 78,627,000 2,881,000 10,147,000 13,028,000 16%
1974 85,936,000 2,874,000 11,794,000 14,668;000 17%
Source: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS
1975-REFERENCE EDITION [BULL. 1865] Table 1, at 26, & Table 47, at 119 (1975).
Note: Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals.









Source: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS
1975-REFERENCE EDITION [BULL. 1865] Table 155, at 382-86 (1975).
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aimed at attaining for public employees the right to bargain collec-
tively, a right guaranteed to workers in the private sector by the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935.0 National legislation had
never extended the right to bargain collectively to public employees;
indeed, all governments-federal, state, and local-traditionally
had prohibited, either by statute or judicial decision, collective bar-
gaining in their public services.'
The transition from uniform disapproval to majority acceptance
of public employer collective bargaining began in 1955, when New
Hampshire adopted legislation authorizing town governments to
engage in collective bargaining with public employee unions." By
the beginning of the 1960's, three additional states had enacted
For a brief history of the organization of teachers and the role of the two major teacher
organizations, the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of
Teachers (AFT) in the development of militant organizations to promote collective bargain-
ing for teachers, see Engel, Teacher Negotiation: History and Comment, 1 J. LAW & ED. 487
(1972). See also M. MOSKOW, TEACHERS AND UNIONS 93-114 (1966). On the NEA, see Muir,
The Tough New Teacher, in THE COLLECTIVE DILEMMA: NEGOTIATIONS IN EDUCATION (P. Carl-
ton & H. Goodwin, eds. 1969). See also E. WESLEY, NEA: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: THE
BUILDING OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION (1957). For the history of the AFT, see R. BRAUN,
TEACHERS AND POWER: THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (1972);
COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION, ORGANIZING THE TEACHING PROFESSION: THE
STORY OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (1955); W. EATON, THE AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 1916-1961: A HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT (1975); J. Clarke, The
American Federation of Teachers: Origins and History from 1870 to 1952, June 1966 (unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
21. For a review of the legal theories utilized by courts to invalidate public employer
collective bargaining in the absence of prohibiting legislation, see Dole, State and Local
Public Employee Collective Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorization,
54 IOWA L. REV. 539 (1969).
In 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated the view that prevailed throughout the
United States prior to the 1960's:
All government employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining, as
usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its distinct
and insurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel management. The
very nature and purposes of the government make it impossible for administrative
officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with employee
organizations. The employer is the whole people who speak by means of laws enacted
by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administratives and employees alike
are governed and guided, and in many instances restricted, by laws which establish
policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters.
Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward, President of the National Federation
of Federal Employees, Aug. 16, 1937, in C. RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAW
436-37 (1946).
22. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (1970).
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similar legislation."' In 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued Ex-
ecutive Order 10988,4 which established the rights of unionization
and collective bargaining for most federal employees."The examples set by the passage of the several state public em-
ployee acts in the 1950's and the promulgation of the Executive
Order affecting federal employees, and the widespread labor unrest
in the public sector," led to the adoption of legislation by an increas-
ing number of states which either permitted or required designated
public employers to bargain collectively with their employees.27
23. Two years after passage of the New Hampshire legislation, the Minnesota legislature
enacted a law requiring all public employers to meet at regular intervals with representatives
selected by their workers in order to negotiate over working conditions in the public service.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.52 (1966), as amended (Supp. 1972). By 1959, Wisconsin and Massa-
chusetts similarly had enacted legislation authorizing municipalities to bargain collectively
with representatives chosen by municipal employees. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40, § 4C (1961),
as amended ch. 149, §§ 178G-N (1971); see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (1974).
24. 3 C.F.R. 521 (Comp. 1959-63), revoked by Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 191
(CoMP. 1969), as amended 3 C.F.R. 505 (1972). Executive Order 11491, which superseded
Executive Order 10988, aligns labor-management relations in the federal sector closely with
labor-management relations in the NLRA-regulated private sector, but retains unique con-
cepts introduced by Executive Order 10988. Executive Order 11491, however, does not apply
to United States Postal Service employees, who are governed by the Postal Reorganization
Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1201-09 (1970), which grants them virtually all rights-except the
right to strike-enjoyed by private industrial workers under the NLRA.
25. Executive Order 10988 was more comprehensive than its earlier state counterparts.
While existing state laws merely authorized or required various public employers to engage
in collective bargaining, Executive Order 10988 established a complete framework for
management-employee relations similar to the one prevailing in the private sector under
the NLRA.
26. The figures in chart 3, page 433 infra, document the widespread labor unrest in the
public sector.
For a thorough summary of teacher strikes occurring during the period 1960-1968, see E.
SHII.S & C. WHITTIER, TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 20-92 (1968).
For a discussion concluding that the public's failure to be even fundamentally fair with its
employees has caused numerous strikes, see Taylor, Public Employment: Strikes or
Procedures?, 20 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 617, 628-29 (1967).
27. States fall into three categories. Some states have a single statute that either autho-
rizes or requires all state public employers to engage in collective bargaining. Other states
divide their public employers into categories, such as school boards or fire departments, and
by separate legislation authorize or require each different group to engage in collective bar-
gaining. Still other states have enacted single public employer collective bargaining acts tlhat
authorize or require only a limited group of public employers to engage in collective bargain-
ing. For the current status of public sector collective bargaining in the individual states, see
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, STATE PROFILES: CURRENT STATUS OF PUBLIC
SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS. See also GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE State and Local
Programs. For a summary and analysis of the scope of bargaining provisions of public em-
ployee bargaining laws, see J. NAJITA, GUIDE TO STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN PUBLIC SECTOR
COILILECTIVE BARGAINING: SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS (1973).
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Chart 3 - Public Sector Strikes
Source: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS
1975-REFERENCE EDITION [BULL. 1865] Table 163, at 406-09 (1975).
* Statistics not available.
** Less than 0.005 per cent, or fewer than 100 workers or days.
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In Pennsylvania, the legal posture of public labor relations prior
to Act 195 was defined by the Public Employe Act of 19475 which
prohibited all strikes by public employees29 and did not require
public employers to bargain collectively with their employees. 3"
Pennsylvania followed the national pattern of post-war expansion of
public employment3 and growth of public employee union organiza-
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1-.5 (1964). This act was repealed by Act 195 as to those
public employees covered by the provisions of Act 195. Id. § 1101.2201 (Supp. 1975).
29. Id. § 215.2 (1964).
30. See id. § 215.1(b).
31. The growth in the number of governmental employees in Pennsylvania is indicated
in the following chart:
Chart 4 - Pennsylvania Governmental Employees
Source: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS
1975-REFERENCE EDITION [BULL. 18651 Table 50, at 124-25 (1975).










tion in the 1960's, 2 accompanied by numerous illegal work stop-
There also occurred, during this period, a growth in the number of teachers in Pennsyl-
vania:
Chart 5 - Professional Employment in Pennsylvania Schools
NUMBER OF PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL
SCHOOL YEAR TEACHERS OTHERS TOTAL
1945-46 54,206 4,595 59,801
1950-51 56,541 6,100 62,641
1955-56 63,470 7,811 71,281
1960-61 75,055 9,257 84,312
1965-66 85,302 11,242 96,544
1970-71 108,772 15,834 124,606
1975-76 116,255 18,100 134,355
Sources: PENNSYLVANIA BUREAU OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, DEP'T OF EDUCATION,
STATISTICAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 1 (1968); PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, 15 OUR SCHOOLS TODAY: THE PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL REPORT, No.
6, 1976, at 3 [hereinafter cited as OUR SCHOOLS TODAY]; 10 OUR SCHOOLS TODAY, Supra,
No. 6, 1971, at 1; PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, STATISTICAL REPORT OF THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION 1 (1963); id. (1959); id. (1953); id. (1948).
32. Typical of the growth of public employee unionization in Pennsylvania is that which
occurred among teachers in the state:
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pages and strikes. 3 The chaotic climate that resulted from this ob-
Chart 6 - Teacher Unionization in Pennsylvania
TEACHER ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP
SCHOOL TOTAL PROFESSIONAL IN PENNSYLVANIA
YEAR PERSONNEL IN PENN-
SYLVANIA PUBLIC NATIONAL EDUCATION AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
SCHOOLS ASSOCIATION (NEA)* TEACHERS (AFT)
1960-61 84,312 53,796 (not available)
1965-66 96,544 61,566 (not available)
1970-71 124,606 85,890 (not available)
1973-74 130,423 96,723 (not available)
Sources: NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, NEA HANDBOOK 155 (1974); NATIONAL EDU-
CATION ASSOCIATION, NEA HANDBOOK 413 (1969); 13 OUR SCHOOLS TODAY, supra note
31, No. 6, 1974, at 2; 10 OUR SCHOOLS TODAY, supra note 31, No. 6, 1971, at 1; 1974
PENNSYLVANIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 181
*NEA membership figures include active, associate, life, and retired members. NEA stu-
dent membership is not included in the figures.
33. Work stoppages in Pennsylvania are indicated in charts 7 & 8:
Chart 7 - Work Stoppages in Pennsylvania
STOPPAGES BEGINNING DAYS IDLE DURING YEAR
IN YEAR (ALL STOPPAGES)
YEAR NUMBER WORKERS NUMBER PERCENT OF
INVOLVED ESTIMATED TOTAL
WORKING TIME
1960 398 180,000 2,040,000 .25
1965 404 132,000 1,640,000 .19
1970 636 278,200 3,695,100 .37
1973 623 201,800 3,031,800 .27
Source: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 1975-REFERENCE EDITION BULL. 1865 Table 164, at 411-19 (1975).
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viously intolerable situation occasioned the creation, in 1968, of the
Governor's Commission to Review the Public Employe Law of
Pennsylvania. :"
This commission, known as the Hickman Commission,35 issued a
report :" recommending repeal of the then existing Public Employe
Chart 8 - Work Stoppages in the Public Sector in Pennsylvania
STOPPAGES BEGINNING
IN YEAR
YEAR NUMBER WORKERS WORK-DAYS
INVOLVED IDLE
1970 30 40,400 44,400
1971 87 36,100 257,800
1972 73 33,900 493,700
1973 65 30,700 652,800
Source: GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE Table 6, at 71:1017-18, Table 8, at 71:1022.
Between July 1960 and June 1974, Pennsylvania witnessed 171 teacher strikes, involving
100,432 personnel, with 1,140,611 work-days lost. In 1973-74, Pennsylvania witnessed 26
teacher strikes, involving 5,507 personnel, with 61,765 work-days lost (.03% of the total work-
days of instruction). GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE Table 1, at 71:1052, Table 2, at
71:1053, Table 5, at 71:1055-56.
On the increase in work stoppages in the public sector, particularly among teachers, see
Gitlow, supra note 18, at 773. For a study concluding that public schools are the most
frequently struck governmental service, with school teachers being involved in the great
majority of such strikes, see Hall, Work Stoppages in Government, 91 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 53
(1968). See also Gov. EMP. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE 71:1011-12.
34. Pennsylvania Governor Raymond P. Shafer directed the Commission to
review the whole area of the relations of public employees and the public employers
and to make recommendations. . . for the establishment of orderly, fair, and workable
procedures governing those relations- including legislation ....
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYE
LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA Appendix A, ii (1968) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION].
35. The twelve-member Commission's popular name was derived from the name of the
chairman, Leon E. Hickman.
36. REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 34.
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Act and the passage of a new law which would permit the right of
all public employees to bargain collectively.37 In recommending this
change, the commission emphasized the need for collective bargain-
ing to restore harmony in the public sector38 and to eliminate the
numerous illegal strikes and the widespread labor unrest. 9
Subsequent to the issuance of the report of the Hickman Commis-
sion, various bills were introduced in the Pennsylvania General As-
sembly to effectuate the commission's recommendations.'" The final
result was the enactment into law, on July 23, 1970, of Act 195. 1'
37. Id. at 3. As indicated previously, in response to the demands of police and firemen,
the Pennsylvania General Assembly had already passed a statute guaranteeing to those two
groups collective bargaining rights, but denying them the right to strike; instead, compulsory
arbitration was provided for as the ultimate impasse resolution device in negotiations over
contract terms. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Supp. 1975). See Note, Pennsylvania's
Proposed Public Employees Relations Act: A Landmark of Sound Progress or an Invitation
to a Quagmire?, 30 U. PITr. L. REV. 693 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, Pennsylvania's
Proposed Public Employees Relations Act].
38. REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 34, at 9.
On the comparative differences in the scope of collective bargaining between the private
and the public sectors, see Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 857-61 (1970). See also H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE
UNIONS AND THE CITIES 202 (1971); Shaw & Clark, The Practical Differences between Public
and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 867 (1972); Summers, Public
Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974).
As to whether private sector collective bargaining could serve as a model for collective
bargaining in the public sector, see Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining
in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969), which takes the position that it could not.
There are others who emphasize the similarities between public and private bargaining and
who would solve problems in the public sector by analogizing to the private sector. See, e.g.,
Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DuQ. L. REV. 357
(1972); Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885
(1973); Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1969). However, most
of those who analogize to the private sector pattern generally acknowledge the need for some
modification. See, e.g., Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment
Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REV. 891, 909 (1969).
39. REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 34, at 6, 7, 9, 17. The Commission's
judgment was that the "inability to bargain collectively has created more ill will and led to
more friction and strikes than any other single cause." Id. at 6. See also Note, Pennsylvania's
Proposed Public Employees Relations Act, supra note 37, at 695.
40. For a synopsis of the subsequent history of the Hickman Commission's Report and
the resultant bills introduced in the Pennsylvania General Assembly, see PENNSYLVANIA
SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, ACT 195, at 1 4-85 (rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ACT 195].
For a critique of the then-proposed legislation, see Note, Pennsylvania's Proposed Public
Employees Relations Act, supra note 37.
41. Act of July 23, 1970, No. 195, [1970] Laws of Pa. 563 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, §§ 1101.101-2301 (Supp. 1975)).
Act 195, as enacted, did not effect all of the Hickman Commission's recommendations. For
example, police and firemen were excluded from the Act's coverage; their separate coverage
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III. THE SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
A. Introduction
The public policy of Pennsylvania has long emphasized the im-
portance of fostering and advancing public education. 2 The primary
responsibility for effecting this policy is constitutionally vested in
the Pennsylvania General Assembly which is to "provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of pub-
lic education."43 To implement this constitutional mandate, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive
Public School Code" that designates local school boards as "agents"
to administer this constitutional duty." The school boards," being
under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Supp. 1975) was continued. These groups were
afforded the right to bargain collectively but not the right to strike.
42. Sagot & Jennings, Limited Right to Strike Laws-Can They Work When Applied to
Public Education, 2 J. LAW & ED. 715, 716-18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sagot & Jennings].
The judicial deference attributed to this policy is succinctly expressed in Commonwealth ex
rel. Hetrick v. Sunbury School Dist., 335 Pa. 6, 11-12, 6 A.2d 279, 281-82 (1939). See also
Appeal of Walker, 332 Pa. 488, 491, 2 A.2d 770, 772 (1938).
43. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14. This constitutional mandate is a direct carryover from PA.
CONST. art. X, § 1 (1874) which directed the legislature to maintain a "thorough and efficient
system of public schools." See generally E. BOLMEIER, SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 63-77
(1968); N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 27-46 (3d ed. 1971).
44. Pennsylvania school districts are established and conducted pursuant to the Public
School Code of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1-101 to 27-2702 (1962). A proposed recodifica-
tion of the Code, containing extensive changes, is currently pending before the Pennsylvania
General Assembly.
45. Wilson v. Philadelphia School Dist., 328 Pa. 225, 231, 195 A. 90, 94 (1937). See also
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Commw. 229,
239, 306 A.2d 404, 410 (1973).
The school district in Pennsylvania is an agency of the state, rather than of a municipality
(even though it might be coexistent with a municipality). Pennsylvania case law character-
izes local school districts and school boards as state agents created by the state for the purpose
of carrying out a purely state function. See, e.g., Slippery Rock Area Joint School Sys. v.
Franklin Township School Dist., 389 Pa. 435, 442, 133 A.2d 848, 852 (1957); Wilson v. Phila-
delphia School Dist., 328 Pa. 225, 230, 195 A. 90, 94 (1937). In practice, however, school boards
are generally perceived as units of local government, and this ambiguity may result in com-
plex legal-conceptual struggles among the city government, the school district, and the state
legislature on a wide variety of school matters. See generally N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 54-142 (3d ed. 1971); E. REUTTER & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION 107-27, 223-44 (1970). This conceptualization/characterization problem also raises
a related issue as to the extent, if any, to which the local electorate may participate in the
formulation of school board policy, i.e., is policy determined by the state, the local school
board, parents, teachers, etc., either solely or in some combination.
46. There are 505 school districts in Pennsylvania, each having a governing board of school
directors. For a complete listing of the 505 school districts in Pennsylvania, see PENNSYLVANIA
DEP'T OF EDUCATION, EDUCATION DIRECTORY (1975). School boards have organized themselves
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creatures of statutory creation, possess only such powers as are spe-
cifically, or by necessary implication, granted to them.47 The Public
School Code, with respect to the administration of school districts,
is a broad statutory grant of managerial prerogative to school
boards."s As a result of this state legislation, the local school board
is the basic unit of educational policy-making and administration."
In light of this, Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that in
exercising their delegated authority over policy matters, school
boards must be given broad discretionary power in order to ensure
the best possible education for the children under their care. 0 While
in general, in the public sector, many non-economic matters lie
into a state-wide organization, the Pennsylvania School Boards Association, headquartered
in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
47. Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. County Board, 418 Pa. 520, 211 A.2d 487 (1965);
Barth v. Philadelphia School Dist., 393 Pa. 557, 143 A.2d 909 (1958). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2-211 (1962) provides: "The several school districts in this Commonwealth shall be, and
hereby are vested as, bodies corporate, with all necessary powers to enable them to carry out
the provisions of this act."
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-510 (1962) sets forth the broad inherent managerial preroga-
tives of school boards as follows:
The board of school directors in any school district may adopt and enforce such
reasonable rules and regulations as it may deem necessary and proper, regarding the
management of its school affairs and the conduct and deportment of all superintend-
ents, teachers, and other appointees or employes during the time they are engaged in
their duties to the district.
49. This is also reflective of the tradition that school governance is a local matter.
The public school, as it exists today, was not adopted in Pennsylvania until many years
after the American Revolution. Although the Pennsylvania Constitutions of 1776, 1790, and
1838 and the laws recognized the schools' vital role in the state, it was only in 1834, after
Governor George Wolf's crusade for education, that the common schools became an integral
part of a state system of public schools. Wilson v. Philadelphia School Dist., 328 Pa. 225,
230-31, 195 A. 90, 94 (1937). On the history of the development of the public school system
in Pennsylvania, see PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T. OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
FREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN PENNSYLVANIA (1934); L. WALSH & M. WALSH, HISTORY AND ORGANIZA-
TION OF EDUCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (1930); J. WICKERSHAM, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN
PENNSYLVANIA (1886); C. Mitchell, The Development and Control of State Support of Educa-
tion in Pennsylvania, June 1931 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pitts-
burgh); J. Nietz, The Constitutional and Legal Bases of the Public School System of Pennsyl-
vania, June 1933 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago).
50. See, e.g., Smith v. Darby School Dist., 388 Pa. 301, 314, 130 A.2d 661, 668-69 (1957):
"School authorities must be given broad discretionary powers to ensure a better education
for the children of this Commonwealth .... ." Thus any restriction in the exercise of a
board's powers has been strictly construed on the theory that its public interest in education
as expressed in its policy decisions predominates over the interest of any individual or group
of individuals. Smith v. Darby School Dist., supra; Walker v. Scranton School Dist., 338 Pa.
104, 12 A.2d 46 (1940). Most case law interpreting the inherent managerial authority of the
school board, however, antedates enactment of the Public Employe Relations Act.
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beyond the authority of the public employer and require legislative
enactment to effect a change, the school board has traditionally
been an exception to the rule that the public employer has less
discretion over management policy than does his private sector
counterpart."
Given the traditionally wide discretion afforded local school
boards in the management of school district affairs, the enactment
of Act 195, which mandated collective bargaining52 while affirming
school board management prerogatives, 3 ensured that the scope of
collective bargaining would be the critically important question.54
Indeed, no other single issue has more exacerbated teacher-school
board bargaining relations."'
The principal conflict as to the scope of bargaining centers upon
two provisions of Act 195,56 each of which was designed to effectuate
an important policy. Section 701,11 captioned "Matters subject to
bargaining," was designed to grant public employees a right to bar-
gain over items basic to the well-being of employees:
Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obli-
gation of the public employer and the representative of the
public employes to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any
question arising thereunder and the execution of a written con-
tract incorporating any agreement reached but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession."
51. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Commw.
229, 244 n.5, 306 A.2d 404, 413 n.5 (1973).
52. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Supp. 1975).
53. See id. § 1101.702.
54. That this is the critical question has been recognized by both teacher organizations
and school boards. See, e.g., Fondy, A Brief Discussion of Pennsylvania's Neu Public Em-
ployee Bargaining Act, 23 THE PUB. SCHOOL DiG., No. 2, 1970-71, at 2 [hereinafter cited as
Fondy]; Heddinger, A Perspective of Pennsylvania's Collective Bargaining Law for Public
Employees, 23 THE PUB. SCHOOL DIG., No. 2, 1970-71, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Heddinger].
55. Comment, The Public Employe Relations Act, supra note 14, at 81.
56. A conflict also exists as to a third provision of Act 195-section 703, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1975). That conflict is dealt with below. See text accompanying
notes 143-47 infra.




Section 702,'1' captioned "Matters not subject to bargaining," was
adopted in the public interest to assure public employers the ability
to manage their institutions in a relatively unfettered fashion. It
provides:
Public employers shall not be required to bargain over mat-
ters of inherent managerial policy, which shall include but
shall not be limited to such areas of discretion or policy as the
functions and programs of the public employer, standards of
services, its overall budget, utilization of technology, the
organizational structure and selection and direction of person-
nel. Public employers, however, shall be required to meet and
discuss on policy matters affecting wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment as well as the impact thereon upon
request by public employe representatives.'"
Thus the stage for conflict was set by these two sections; one
establishes certain basic items as mandatorily bargainable and spe-
cifically exempts nothing from the scope of collective bargaining,
while the other allows relatively unfettered exercise of discretion by
the school board in overall school management, making permissive
the discussion of matters of inherent managerial policy.'
B. The Teachers' Perspective
A proper understanding of the teachers' perspective is premised
on a clear perception of the forces that have moved teachers to
negotiate collectively. The contributing factors that account for the
shift from relative docility to aggressive militancy are to be found
in teachers themselves, in the school systems in which they work,
and in the larger society in which they live.62
59. Id. § 1101.702.
60. Id.
61. I.e., the language of the management prerogative exception is so broad that many of
the conditions of employment arguably may not be negotiated without the employer's con-
sent.
62. These contributing factors include: (1) the personal desire on the part of teachers to
be professionals and to aspire to professional level social and economic rewards; (2) the larger
percentage of men who have entered the teaching profession and who are determined to enjoy
a rewarding career; (3) the increased level of preparation, expertise, and technology which
today's teachers bring to their work; (4) the pressures and impersonal relations (as among
teachers, school boards, and students) which result from large school systems; and finally,
without having exhausted the causal factors, (5) the greater acceptance of bargaining in the
public sector of the economy. Francis, Collective Bargaining and Professional Negotiation in
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The thrust of the teachers' collective bargaining effort is not only
toward better salaries and improved working conditions but also
toward shared control over policy formulation and administrative
decision-making in areas traditionally considered the unilateral re-
sponsibility of boards and administrators.A3 This desire for shared
control forms the core of teacher philosophy toward collective bar-
gaining, as expounded by both teacher association leaders 4 and by
leading educators,65 the rationale being that inspired teaching and
professional dedication are not compatible with unilateral decision-
making. With such a view, the traditional school board-dominated
system does not adequately utilize the constructive contributions
that teachers can make in the formulation of educational pro-
grams.6
The restrictive approach to inherent managerial policy taken by
school boards" under Act 195 is labeled by teachers as "unreason-
able, unrealistic and unenforceable," rendering the collective bar-
gaining process little more than "advisory" in nature. 8 The teach-
Public Schools, 19 THE PuB. SCHOOL DIG., No. 2, 1966-67, at 58, 60 [hereinafter cited as
Francisi. See also Note, Collective Bargaining and the California Public Teacher, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 340, 340-48 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, Collective Bargainingl.
63. Francis, supra note 62, at 60.
The issue, from the teachers' point of view, is not a threshold one of whether professional
public employees should participate in decisions about the nature of the services they pro-
vide. Teachers take it as a given that every school district should be interested in, and heavily
reliant upon, the judgment of its professional staff. The issue, from such a perspective, rather
is the manner of that participation. Conclusions about that issue go to the heart of the
decision-making process and the impact of collective bargaining on that process.
64. See, e.g., Fondy, supra note 54.
65. See, e.g., Francis, supra note 62.
66. Indeed, the argument has been made that school boards are not possessed of superior
expertise in discharging the duty with which they are statutorily charged. "[Tlhey are at
best dilettantes as to what is, or is not, sound education. Conversely, their employees, the
teachers, are trained and certified in the production and evaluation of sound education." R.
DOHERTY & W. OBERER, TEACHERS, SCHOOL BOARDS, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A CHANGING
OF THE GUARD 90 (1967) (emphasis in original). This argument must be understood in light of
the fact that school board members are traditionally unpaid and have full-time jobs by which
they earn their living. Thus unlike other public officers, they are not continuously involved
in operations and are not familiar with the day-to-day functioning of the school system. F.
LIVINGSTON, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE SCHOOL BOARD, PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC
UNIONS 63, 73 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as LIVINGSTON]. See also Note,
Collective Bargaining, supra note 62, at 375.
67. See, e.g., ACT 195, supra note 40; Heddinger, supra note 54. The restrictive approach
as to the scope of collective bargaining is reflected in the periodicals of the Pennsylvania
School Boards Association: ACT 195, supra note 40; INFORMATION LEGISLATIVE SERVICE; NEGO-
TIATIONS GUIDEBOOK; NEGOTIATION GUIDELINES; PSBA BULLETIN.
68. Fondy, supra note 54, at 2.
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ers' interpretation of "wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment" under section 701 of Act 195 is a very broad one.
Teachers hold that virtually all items are negotiable,69 reasoning
that policy decisions which would have no effect on the terms and
conditions of employment or production of other public employees
do have a significant effect on the employment conditions of teach-
ers.7" Thus, teachers interpret the above-quoted phrase to include
literally hundreds of items,7 among which are class size,72 student
discipline, curriculum determination,73 and extracurricular assign-
ments."4 The essence of the teachers' position is that all matters
connected with terms and conditions of employment must be re-
garded as negotiable issues since no state statute contains any ex-
plicit prohibition against bargaining on them.75
C. The School Board's Perspective
A school board is unique among public employers; its perspective
on collective bargaining arises from its singular structure and func-
tions. Unlike most other governmental units, a school board is a
legislative as well as an executive body.76 A school board, in addition
69. Id. at 3.
70. For example, a typical government clerk works eight hours daily. If there are fewer
clerks working with him, this simply means that work is turned out more slowly; it does not
necessarily result in more burdensome working conditions for the clerk. On the other hand,
fewer teachers means that each teacher has a greater load of students andthis does affect
the conditions of his employment. LIVINGSTON, supra note 66, at 63, 68.
71. Collective bargaining negotiations between a teachers' association and a school board
may deal with hundreds of items, and the resulting collective bargaining agreement may
include as many items. See D. WOLLETT & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER
NEGOTIATIONS (1974). See also NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR PROFES-
SIONAL NEGOTIATION (rev. ed. 1965).
72. On this most "ancient" of items, see H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS
AND THE CITIES 137-38 (1971). See also Jascourt, The Scope of Negotiations in Public Educa-
tion: Overview, 2 J. LAW & ED. 137, 138 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Jascourt]; Note,
Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 288 (1969).
73. On the increasing commonness of this as an item of teacher involvement, see Wollett,
The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1017, 1027 (1969).
74. Francis, supra note 62, at 45, 58.
75. This philosophy is reflected in the principal periodicals of the National Education
Association and its Pennsylvania affiliate, the Pennyslvania State Education Association:
NEA HANDBOOK; NEA NEWSLETTER; NEA RESEARCH BULLETIN; NEA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH;
NEA RESEARCH REPORT; PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL JOURNAL; TODAY'S EDUCATION: NEA JOURNAL.
A similar philosophy is reflected in the principal periodicals of the American Federation of
Teachers: CHANGING EDUCATION; THE AMERICAN TEACHER.
76. While it is true that, in some local governmental units, there is some mingling of
executive and legislative functions, school boards are the only major spending unit of state
or local government in which the legislative and executive functions are completely mixed.
Vol. 14: 427
Comment
to the executive function of administering the school system
through its staff, also performs the legislative functions of raising
funds through taxes, allocating these funds by adopting budgets,
and setting general policies for the school district."
The role of a school board in the area of collective bargaining is
likewise unique. While other governmental executive officers negoti-
ate directly with public employees, as does a school board, such
negotiations are either subject to the appropriation of funds by a
different and independent legislative body or must be kept within
the parameters of funding previously appropriated by the legisla-
ture for employee salaries and benefits. Such is not the case with
school boards."8 On the other side of the coin, legislative bodies act
similarly to school boards in levying taxes and appropriating funds
but, unlike school boards, do not bargain with public employees.
The problem for school boards arises because they must legislate
when confronted with collective bargaining responsibilities with
which a legislative body normally does not deal. 9
The basic school board perspective is reflected in its concept of
itself as the protector of the public interest"0 rather than as an em-
ployer. The school board's view is that it is prohibited from negoti-
77. LIVINsSTON, supra note 66, at 64.
78. In Pennsylvania, school districts are empowered to levy taxes, not to exceed millage
rates as set by the Pennsylvania General Assembly. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 6-652,
-672 (1962).
79. LIVINGSTON, supra note 66, at 64-65.
80. For an example of this viewpoint, see the statement of the executive secretary of the
Pennsylvania School Boards Association in Heddinger, supra note 54, at 4-5 ("ensuring that
employers . . . effectively represent general public interest").
Public employers may ground their reluctance to bargain on certain items on the argument
that the decision-making authority is vested in them as a public trust, a trust that cannot
be shared with the employees. This concept may be subject to challenge in that the same
individuals who define themselves as holding a public trust may not be accountable to the
public. Moreover, when asked to share this same trust with the public, their response is not
infrequently negative. In reality, the public trust concept, as a limitation to bargaining, is
more illusory than real. This is especially true for school boards who are not elected by the
public, but instead are appointed officials.
In Pennsylvania, all school boards, except two, are elected. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 3-
303 to -306 (1962). The two exceptions are Philadelphia and Pittsburgh where school directors
are appointed by the judges of the court of common pleas of the county wherein each school
district is situated, Id. § 3-302. A recent statutory enactment, id. § 3-302.1 (Supp. 1975),
provided for a public referendum to be conducted within the Pittsburgh school district to
determine if the citizens desired retention of the existing appointive system or direct election




ating on any item unless the law expressly requires it to be negoti-
ated. ," The board generally considers any concession that it makes
through negotiations as compromising the public good and tends to
resist teachers' demands as an unwarranted intrusion into its here-
tofore unfettered discretion in the management of all aspects of the
school district.2 Where the perspective is grounded upon an overrid-
ing obligation to the children and the general public, it is little
wonder that school boards believe that collective bargaining proce-
dures cannot be allowed to impinge upon the education of children . 3
The same items which teachers consider part of the "terms and
conditions of employment" are not considered so by the boards. The
school board has an interest in maintaining its organizational struc-
ture by regulating everything from class size to extracurricular as-
signments, and in controlling the enormous budgetary effect of
those items, measured primarily in terms of manpower and facili-
ties.84
While a redefinition of roles is taking place and a change from
unilateral to bilateral decision-making is occurring, school boards
have displayed their intention to remain as the executives who de-
termine policy-while policy may be recommended by faculty, or
faculty and school board together, it cannot safely be left to the art
of compromise, that is, to collective bargaining. 5
D. The Conflict of Perspectives
Reflective of the previously-mentioned perspectives of teachers
and school boards, the period of time since passage of Act 195 has
witnessed an effort by teachers to expand the scope of negotiable
items and an equally determined effort by school boards to assert
managerial rights-both groups relying upon sections 701 and 702
of Act 195 to support their respective positions. This has resulted
in such serious disagreements that judicial interpretation of those
two sections of the Act has been necessary to resolve the issues
presented.
81. This viewpoint is reflected in the publications of the Pennsylvania School Boards
Association. See note 67 supra.
82. Sagot & Jennings, supra note 42, at 716. As to the extent of this discretion, see text
accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
83. Heddinger, supra note 54, at 5, 8.
84. Jascourt, supra note 72, at 137-38.
85. Metzler, The Need for Limitation Upon the Scope of Negotiations in Public Educa-
tion, 1, 2 J. LAW & ED. 139 (1973).
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Three cases"6 have reached the Pennsylvania appellate courts on
the issues of what is encompassed by the phrase "meet and dis-
cuss' 8' and what is encompassed by the term "mandatory" in
collective bargaining situations affecting public education. These
decisions are somewhat in conflict.8 However, two recent decisions
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 9 may be read as the first steps
in establishing an identifiable guide for determing the scope of
collective bargaining in public education under Act 195.
E. Judicial Interpretation
The difficulty in determining the scope of collective bargaining
with some relative precision may be accounted for not only because
of the apparent conflict between the statutory provisions of Act 195,
but also because there exist one administrative body " and three
levels of the judiciary" that may be called upon to address that
issue, with the resultant possibility of varying or even contradictory
decisions. The importance of this complicating procedure and the
confusion which can result is amply reflected in the administrative
and judicial history of Act 195 in the first five years after its enact-
ment.
86. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, AFT, 346 A.2d 35 (Pa. 1975); Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 337 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975); Canon-McMillan School Bd.
v. Commonwealth, 12 Pa. Commw. 323, 316 A.2d 114 (1974).
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(17) (Supp. 1975) reads:
"Meet and discuss" means the obligation of a public employer upon request to meet
at reasonable times and discuss recommendations submitted by representatives of
public employes: Provided, That any decisions or determinations on matters so dis-
cussed shall remain with the public employer and be deemed final on any issue or
issues raised.
88. Compare, e.g., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist.,
337 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975), with Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School
Dist., 9 Pa. Commw. 229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973) (same case). See also Canon-McMillan School
Bd. v. Commonwealth, 12 Pa. Commw. 323, 328, 316 A.2d 114, 117 (1974) (Mencer, J.,
dissenting), wherein the view was expressed that the commonwealth court's decision in
Canon-McMillan was "diametrically opposite" the same court's decision in State College,
supra.
89. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, AFT, 346 A.2d 35 (Pa. 1975); Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 337 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975).
90. The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board [hereinafter referred to as PLRB or Boardl.
The three-member Board, which was created by and which functions under PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 211.4 (1964), is a division of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry
and is headquartered in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Regional offices of the PLRB are located
in Philadelphia and in Pittsburgh. As to the extent of the role that the PLRB is to play in
interpreting Act 195, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.501-.503 (Supp. 1975).
91. The courts of common pleas, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court.
1976
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The first case to involve the scope of collective bargaining in
public education under Act 195 was State College Area School
District,2 which arose less than four months after the effective date
of the Act. 3 That case arose out of negotiations between the State
College Area School District and the State College Area Education
Association (SCAEA), which represented elementary and secondary
school teachers employed by the school district. On February 26,
1971, the teachers' association filed an unfair practice charge94 with
the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB), alleging that the
school directors had acted contrary to the provisions of section
1201(a)(5) 5 of Act 195 by refusing to bargain" over twenty-three
items 7 as required by section 701.
92. 1 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 115 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1971), rev'd in part on rehearing, 2 Pa.
Pub. Emp. Rep. 102 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd.), rev 'd in part, 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 177 (C. P. Centre
Co. 1972), aft'd, 9 Pa. Commw. 229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973), rev'd, 337 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975).
93. Act 195, enacted into law on July 23, 1970, took effect ninety days later, on October
21, 1970. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.2301 (Supp. 1975).
94. Id. § 1101.301(8) reads: " 'Unfair practice' means any practice prohibited by Article
XII of this act." Article XII of Act 195 enumerates a long list of prohibited acts. See id. §
1101.1201.
95. Id. § 1101.1201(a)(5) provides:
(a) Public employers, their agents or representatives are prohibited from:
(5) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an employe representative
which is the exclusive representative of employes in an appropriate unit, including but
not limited to the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative.
96. The school board had offered to "meet and discuss" with the teachers in respect to
the items, in accordance with section 702 of Act 195. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v.
State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Commw. 229, 232 n.1, 306 A.2d 404, 407 n.1 (1973).
As to the definition of "meet and discuss," see note 87 supra.
97. The twenty-three items were:
1. The availability of proper and adequate classroom instructional printed material;
2. The provision for time during the school day for team planning of required innova-
tive programs;
3. The timely notice of teaching assignment for the coming year;
4. Providing separate desks and lockable drawer space for each teacher in the dis-
trict;
5. Providing cafeteria for teachers in the senior high school;
6. Eliminating the requirement that teachers perform non-teaching duties such as
but not limited to hall duty, bus duty, lunch duty, study hall, and parking lot duties;
7. Eliminating the requirement that teachers teach or supervise two consecutive
periods in two different buildings;
8. Eliminating the requirement that teachers substitute for other teachers during
planning periods and teaching in non-certificated subject areas;
9. Eliminating the requirement that teachers chaperone athletic activities;
10. Eliminating the requirement that teachers unpack, store, check or otherwise
handle supplies;
1976 Comment
Following a three-day hearing before an examiner, the PLRB on
October 14, 1971, issued a nisi decision and order"5 which held that
none of the items99 were negotiable and dismissed the charge.'""
Following a personnel change in the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board,'0 ' SCAEA filed an amended charge with the PLRB. An addi-
tional hearing was held and on June 26, 1972, the PLRB issued a
11. Providing that there shall be one night each week free for Association meetings;
12. Providing that a teacher will, without prior notice, have free access to his person-
nel file;
13. Permitting a teacher to leave the building any time during the school day unless
he has a teaching assignment;
14. Providing special teachers with preparation time equal to that provided for other
staff members;
15. Provision for maximum class sizes;
16. Provision that the Association will be consulted in determining the school calen-
dar;
17. Provision that school will officially close at noon of the last day of classes for
Thanksgiving, Christmas, Spring and Summer vacation;
18. Provision that at least one half of the time requested for staff meetings be held
during the school day;
19. A provision that school teachers not be required to be in the school more than
10 minutes prior to the time students are required to be in attendance and not more
than 10 minutes after students are dismissed;
20. A provision that the present Tuesday afternoon conference with parents be
abolished and teachers hold conferences with parents by appointment at a mutually
convenient time;
21. Provision that secondary teachers not be required to teach more than 25 periods
per week and have at least one planning period per day;
22. A provision that elementary teachers shall have one period or fifteen minutes per
day for planning purposes; and
23. Provision for released time for the president of the Association for Association
business.
Record at 469a-71a, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist.,
337 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975). For clarity, the same item numbers used before the PLRB have been
retained throughout this comment.
98. A nisi decision and order is a provisional decree which is made absolute unless, within
the prescribed time, the party affected by it shows cause why it should not be made absolute.
6A M. LEWIS, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACrICE ch. 29, § 92 (1960). See also BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 1197 (4th ed. 1951).
99. Items 19 and 23, supra note 97, were withdrawn by mutual consent of the parties at
the hearing and were not in issue at the time of the nisi decision and order.
100. 1 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. at 117.
101. A change in the personnel of the PLRB occurred in'December 1971. Chairman Petri-
kin and Member Stuart were replaced, respectively, by Chairman Scheib and Member Jones.
Member Licastro continued to serve on the Board. AcT 195, supra note 40, at 82. That
personnel change in the three-member Board, the composition of which is the same at the
time of this writing, resulted in a decisive shift in the Board's decisions involving the scope
of collective bargaining in public education. That shift in decision-making is dealt with infra.
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final order""2 which reversed its previous nisi order as to five items,' 3
ruling that the school district had failed to bargain in good faith
with the teachers on those items which the PLRB found to be mat-
ters for mandatory collective bargaining under section 701; the
PLRB reaffirmed the nisi order as to the remaining items which it
ruled were part of inherent managerial policy and hence not bar-
gainable by virtue of section 702 of the Act. Upon petition for review
of the PLRB's final order,104 the Court of Common Pleas of Centre
County reversed the PLRB on the five items found negotiable and
sustained the PLRB on the remaining non-negotiable items.'"' Ap-
peal to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court followed, where it
was held that none of the items were mandatory subjects for collec-
tive bargaining.' 6
A second case, Canon-McMillan School Board,'"7 appeared less
than a week after the State College suit was initiated. There the
Canon-McMillan Education Association filed an unfair practice
charge with the PLRB against the Canon-McMillan School Board,
alleging a violation of section 1201(a)(5). 1°8 At the examiner's hear-
ing, all items except one were withdrawn. 19 On August 20, 1971, the
PLRB handed down a nisi order which held that the Board had
committed an unfair practice in refusing to bargain on that one
102. State College Area School Dist., 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 102, 104 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd.
1972).
103. The five items were: (3) the timely notice of teaching assignment for the coming year;
(5) providing cafeteria for teachers in the Senior High School; (9) eliminating the requirement
that teachers chaperone athletic activities; (12) providing that a teacher will, without prior
notice, have free access to his personnel file; and (17) provision that school will officially close
at noon of the last day of classes for Thanksgiving, Christmas, Spring and Summer vacation.
Id. at 103.
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1502 (Supp. 1975) provides for review of a PLRB final
order in the appropriate court of common pleas.
105. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 2 Pa. Pub.
Emp. Rep. 177 (C.P. Centre Co. 1972).
106. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Commw.
229, 246, 306 A.2d 404, 414 (1973). The court was divided, however; three of the seven judges
dissented in part, arguing that a balancing test should be employed to resolve the conflicts
between sections 701 and 702, and finding that items 3 and 22 were bargainable. See id. at
247-50, 306 A.2d at 414-16 (Kramer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107. 1 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 83 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1971), aff'd, 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 22
(Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd.), aff'd, 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 204 (C.P. Wash. Co. 1972), afJ'd, 12 Pa.
Commw. 323, 316 A.2d 114 (1974).
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a)(5) (Supp. 1975).
109. That item was compensation for extracurricular duties of teachers.
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item."" On January 18, 1972, the new PLRB"' issued a final order"'
which in effect affirmed the prior nisi order. The Court of Common
Pleas of Washington County affirmed the PLRB's final order."' The
school board appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
which, in January 1974, upheld the decisions of both the PLRB and
the lower court that the item was bargainable."4 Two members of
the commonwealth court dissented, however, contending that the
Canon-McMillan decision was "diametrically opposite" the same
court's State College decision issued less than eight months ear-
lier."
To summarize, the following situation existed at the time when
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entertained, as a case of first im-
pression, the appeal in State College. The Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
tions Board had initially taken a position that indicated a very
narrow scope of bargainable items in teacher-school board negotia-
tions,"' although the board did not totally reject the existence of
bargainable items."7 However, following a change in the personnel
of the Board,"8 that agency modified its stand, broadening some-
what the scope of bargainable items, as determined on a case-by-
case basis." 9 Two courts of common pleas had reached different
results as to the scope of bargainable items under Act 195.120 A
110. 1 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. at 84.
111. See note 101 supra.
112. Canon-McMillan School Bd., 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 22, 23 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972).
113. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Canon-McMillan School Bd., 2 Pa. Pub. Emp.
Rep. 204 (C.P. Wash. Co. 1972). In its order, the three-judge panel adopted and approved,
without discussion, the PLRB's final order.
114. Canon-McMillan School Bd. v. Commonwealth, 12 Pa. Commw. 323, 327, 316 A.2d
114, 116 (1974).
115. Id. at 327, 328, 316 A.2d at 116, 117 (Mencer, J., dissenting). Judge Rogers joined in
the dissent.
116. See State College Area School Dist., 1 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 115 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd.
1971).
117. See, e.g., Canon-McMillan School Bd., 1 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 83 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd.
1971).
118. See note 101 supra.
119. See State College Area School Dist., 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 102 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd.
1972).
120. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Canon-McMillan School Bd., 2 Pa. Pub. Emp.
Rep. 204 (C.P. Wash. Co. 1972); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area
School Dist., 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 177 (C.P. Centre Co. 1972).
It is unclear whether the Canon-McMillan court had available, at the time it handed down
its order, a copy of the Centre County Court's opinion in State College. If the Canon-
McMillan court did not have that opinion available, its failure to write an opinion in the
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divided commonwealth court in State College adopted a stringent
two-part test 2' to be met before an item could be deemed bargaina-
ble; in Canon-McMillan, the same court appeared to speak with a
different voice-the State College dissenting judges formed a new
majority, with the author of the State College opinion now dissent-
ing. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in State
College,'22 rendered in April 1975, was envisioned as providing the
opportunity to clarify, amidst a confusing jumble of administrative
and judicial decisions, the scope of collective bargaining in public
education under Act 195.
The threshold issue faced by the supreme court in State College
was whether the precedent developed in private sector labor rela-
tions by the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts
would apply in public sector labor relations in Pennsylvania since
section 701 had incorporated the language of section 8(d) of the
National Labor Relations Act.2 3 In interpreting the key phrase of
section 8(d), "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment," the National Labor Relations Board and. the federal
courts had developed a distinction in the scope of bargaining in the
private sector between "mandatory" and "permissive" subjects of
Canon-McMillan case may be accounted for by a possible reluctance to become the first court
in Pennsylvania to render a decision interpreting Act 195. If the Canon-McMillan court did
have the State College opinion available, either the urgency for an immediate decision or a
reluctance to take judicial notice of the Centre County Court's decision may account for the
lack of an opinion.
121. See note 141 infra.
122. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 337 A.2d 262
(Pa. 1975).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
. For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agree-
ment reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
The above-quoted language is tracked in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Supp. 1975)
which reads:
Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obligation of the public
employer and the representative of the public employes to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunder
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession.
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bargaining. Mandatory subjects, requiring bargaining until im-
passe, are those matters which directly relate to "wages, hours, and
working conditions."'' 4 All other subjects"2 5 are labeled permissive
subjects, which need be the focus of negotiation only if both parties
agree, i.e., bargaining with respect to permissive subjects is discre-
tionary for both parties,' 6 and neither is required to bargain in good
faith to the point at which agreement or impasse is reached.'
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that there is
a carryover of the underlying distinction between mandatory and
permissive subjects of bargaining, it declined to employ private sec-
tor precedent to resolve public sector cases that arise under Act
195. ' The court specifically declined to accept a ready-made body
of precedent, opting instead to resolve disputes on a "case-by-case
basis" until overall principles could be developed.' 9
The resolution of this threshold issue required the court to address
the remaining issues, namely the apparent conflict between sections
701 and, respectively, sections 702 and 703 of Act 195. If these sec-
tions were read literally and given full sweep, each would virtually
eclipse the other. When the provisions of a statute are ambiguous,
the legislative intent must be determined. In accordance with
section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act,'"" the court as-
124. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
125. Except illegal subjects of bargaining.
126. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
127. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
128. 337 A.2d at 264. That such precedent may be used, however, has not been ruled out
inasmuch as the court recognized that these decisions may provide some guidance. Id. Thus
the PLRB and the Pennsylvania courts may utilize such federal precedent from the private
sector. Arguably, such precedent must first satisfy the balancing test as formulated by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See text accompanying note 137 infra. Since the court consid-
ers such "analogies [to] have limited application" it may be anticipated that the court will
not readily favor the use of such precedent when cases containing such arise on appeal.
The PLRB has recognized the significance of decisions construing the NLRA in general and
section 8(d) in particular. See, e.g., North Hills School Dist., 7 PA. PUB. EMP. REP. 44 (Pa.
Lab. Rel. Bd. 1976); Temple University, 3 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 209 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1973);
Jeannette Dist. Memorial Hospital, Case No. PERA-C-1358-W (Oct. 6, 1972), rev'd, 3 Pa.
Pub. Emp. Rep. 110 (C.P. Westmoreland Co. 1973); City of Pittsburgh, 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep.
216 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972); Borough of Wilkinsburg, 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 154 (Pa. Lab.
Rel. Bd. 1972), aff 'd sub nom., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Employees' Committee,
16 Pa. Commw. 640, 330 A.2d 306 (1975).
129. 337 A.2d at 265.
130. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1921(c) (Supp. 1973) provides that, where the words
of a statute are ambiguous, the intention of the Pennsylvania General Assembly may be
ascertained by considering, inter alia:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
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certained the legislative intent by considering the occasion and ne-
cessity for the statute, the former law, and the mischief to be reme-
died or the object to be attained.' This inquiry led the court to view
the declaration of policy in Act 19512 as clearly establishing the
legislature's general intent that "the right to collective bargaining
was necessary to promote orderly and constructive relationships
between public employers and employes.' 13 3 From this the court
concluded that, given the legislative recognition of the crucial right
of collective bargaining, the legislature would not deliberately in-
tend to secure harmony in the public sector by providing an "illu-
sory right of collective bargaining.' ' 134
To resolve the conflict between sections 701 and 702-the crux of
the dispute in determining the scope of collective bargaining-the
court adopted a "balancing test" between those matters relating to
"wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment"
which are mandatory subjects of bargaining, and those matters of
"inherent managerial policy" which do not require bargaining but
are only "meet and discuss" items. '3  The paramount concern in
striking the balance is the true public interest, which the court
defined as "the effective and efficient operation of public employ-
ment."1' 3
The balancing test, as formulated by the court, is: "[w]hether
the impact of the issue on the interest of the employe in wages,
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar
subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
The above is a statutory codification of existing case law. See, e.g., In re Martin's Estate,
365 Pa. 280, 74 A.2d 120 (1950).
131. Omitted from the analysis of the statutory provisions was any reference to the legisla-
tive history of Act 195, inasmuch as no formal legislative history existed in the Pennsylvania
General Assembly as to that Act. See Brief for Intervenor-Appellant, AFSCME at 12, Penn-
sylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 271 (Pa. 1975).
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1975). See note 12 supra.
133. 337 A.2d at 266. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1975).
134. 337 A.2d at 266.
135. Id. at 268.
136. Id. at 267. The court rejected the commonwealth court's view that the public interest
was synonymous with preservation of inherent managerial policy while the employees' con-




hours and terms and conditions of employment outweighs its proba-
ble effect on the basic policy of the system as a whole."'' The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's test was not original; rather the
court adopted, with a slight but significant modification, the test
formulated by the Kansas Supreme Court 3 ' to resolve questions
relating to the scope of collective bargaining under the Kansas pub-
lic employee act covering public school teachers.'39 The Kansas
court had formulated the test thusly: "The key . . . is how direct
the impact of an issue is on the well-being of the individual teacher,
as opposed to its effect on the operation of the school system as a
whole."' 4 ° The significant difference in the Pennsylvania court's for-
mulation of the test is its substitution of the word "interest" for the
term "well-being." "Well-being" lends itself to an objective and
somewhat narrow definition; "interest," on the other hand, is argua-
bly broader in its extent. Those items which may impact on a
teacher's "interest" in "wages, hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment" are of greater dimension than those which
may impact on the teacher's "well-being." The formulation of such
a test represents the court's adoption of a standard which will pro-
vide a broader interpretation of section 701 rights than the Kansas
test would have afforded.' Thus, under the balancing test, where
137. Id. at 268.
138. See National Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973).
139. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5413 to -5424 (1972).
140. 212 Kan. at 753, 512 P.2d at 435.
141. The supreme court's adoption of this balancing approach, a concept advocated by
Judge Kramer of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in his dissenting opinion in the
same case, 9 Pa. Commw. at 249, 306 A.2d at 415, was an explicit rejection of the common-
wealth court majority's approach in making section 701 subject to section 702. The common-
wealth court had devised a two-step inquiry to determine bargainability of a disputed item.
First, an inquiry was to be made to determine if the item were one of "wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment" under section 701. If it were not, the inquiry need not
proceed further; if it were, the inquiry would proceed to the controlling question: does the
item involve "inherent managerial policy" under section 702? If it did, bargaining would not
be required. Id. at 238, 306 A.2d at 409-10. Thus, under the commonwealth court view, any
item of "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment," if "affected" by a
policy determination, would not be mandatorily bargainable, id. at 244, 306 A.2d at 412-13,
but would be only subject to the "meet-and-discuss" requirement.
Since every "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment" issue is arguably
"affected" by some managerial policy determination (e.g., virtually every item which directly
affects working conditions, wages or hours necessarily has a direct "impact on the overall
budget" under the provisions of section 702 and, hence, would be non-negotiable), the su-
preme court rejected such a test as effectively emasculating section 701 and as thwarting the
legislative policy embodied in Act 195. 337 A.2d at 267. See also 9 Pa. Commw. at 247, 306
A.2d at 414 (Kramer, J., dissenting).
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a disputed item is a matter of fundamental concern to the employ-
ees' interest in "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment," it is not removed from the section 701 requirement
of good faith bargaining simply because it may touch upon basic
policy.112
An additional conflict purportedly existed in State College,
namely that between sections 701 and 703. Section 703 provides:
The parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect
or implement a provision in a collective bargaining agreement
if the implementation of that provision would be in violation
of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any statute or stat-
utes enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania or the provisions of municipal home rule
charters.'43
The issue was thus raised in State College as to whether section 703
mandates that the duties imposed and the prerogatives granted to
school boards under the Public School Code of 1949 may not be the
subject of collective bargaining. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated that the mere fact that a particular item may be covered by
legislation would not remove it from collective bargaining under
section 701 "if it bears on the question of wages, hours and condi-
tions of employment.' ' 4 Moreover the fact that the legislature has
granted a prerogative to school boards does not preclude the mana-
gerial decision to exercise that prerogative from being the subject
of collective bargaining. 4 '
Section 703 does not further define "inherent managerial policy"
as set forth in section 702. The fact that a prerogative is statutorily
recognized, as by the School Code, does not mandate that it be
included within the "inherent managerial policy" concept of section
The supreme court's balancing test may be compared to that devised by Judge Kramer,
dissenting in the commonwealth court's decision in State College, which read: "If the item
directly affects a teacher's personal rights, as it relates to wages, hours and conditions of
employment, then it is subject to collective bargaining," 9 Pa. Commw, at 249, 306 A.2d at
415. Kramer repeated his test in his dissent in Pennsylvania Social Servs. Union v. Pennsyl-
vania Labor Reations Bd., 15 Pa. Commw. 441, 445, 325 A.2d 659, 661 (1974) (Kramer, J.,
dissenting). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted this test, without commenting upon it.
The court's disinclination to adopt such a formula may be due to its desire to provide a
broader interpretation of section 701 rights, consonant with what the court considered the
legislative intent in Act 195 to be, than even Judge Kramer's test would have secured.
142. 337 A.2d at 268.
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1975).




702. The determination of whether an item falls within the confines
of section 702 is to be reached solely on the basis of the application
of the balancing test as formulated by the court. Thus, given the
court's broad interpretation of section 701, and its restrictive inter-
pretation of section 703, a bargainable item under section 701 can
only be excluded under section 703 when an applicable statutory
provision "explicitly and definitively prohibit[s the school board]
from making an agreement as to that specific term or condition of
employment.""' In other words, "[slection 703 merely prevents a
term of a collective bargaining agreement from being in violation of
existing law." '' 47
This last statement became the focal point of the second case to
reach the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealing with the scope of
collective bargaining in public education, Board of Education v.
Local 3, AFT.'4 1 In Local 3, AFT, the issue before the court was
whether a school district could agree to submit the propriety of
discharging a non-tenured teacher to arbitration. The school board
maintained that the contractual provision in the collective bargain-
ing agreement which provided for arbitration in such cases was an
illegal delegation to a third party of the exclusive powers conferred
on the board by the Public School Code of 1949,'41 and therefore
invalid under section 703 of Act 195. Affirming the court of common
pleas' decision,'50 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
146. Id. at 270. Although the court did not include "wages and hours" in this statement,
they are presumably also bargainable notwithstanding even an "explicit and definitive"
statutory prohibition.
The court's phrasing of the requirement to be met before excluding a section 701 bargain-
able item under section 703 is taken from Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d
N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972), wherein the New York Court of Appeals,
interpreting its Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Taylor Law), stated:
Under the Taylor Law, the obligation to bargain as to all terms and conditions of
employment is a broad and unqualified one ...except in cases where some other
applicable statutory provision explicitly and definitively prohibits the public employer
from making an agreement as to a particular term or condition of employment.
Id. at 129, 282 N.E.2d at 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 23 (emphasis added).
147. 337 A.2d at 269.
148. 346 A.2d 35 (Pa. 1975).
149. Public School Code of 1949 §§ 510, 514, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5-510, -514 (1962)
govern discharge of non-tenured teachers. Justice Pomeroy, in his dissent, asserted that the
provisions relevant to discharge of a non-tenured teacher were sections 1108 and 1122 of the
Public School Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1108, -1122 (1962). This difference among
members of the court as to the relevant statutory sections did not affect either the majority's
or the dissenter's analyses.
150. Board of Educ. v. Local 3, AFT, Civil No. 1574 (Pa. C.P. Phila. Co., Oct. Term 1974),
cited in 346 A.2d at 35.
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school board may agree to such a provision without violating section
703 of the Act.'
Analysis of the court's construction of the key phrase in section
703-that an item is improperly included in a collective bargaining
agreement if its implementation would be "in violation of, or incon-
sistent with, or in conflict with" any statute-raised the question
of whether the phrase "in violation of" subsumes the phrases "in-
consistent with" and "in conflict with." While Justice Pomeroy, in
dissent, argued that the majority had improperly confined its con-
sideration of the board's claim to a determination of whether the
contractual provision was "in violation of" existing law and had
ignored the question of whether it was also "inconsistent with, or in
conflict with" existing law,' the majority maintained that there
was neither an inconsistency with the School Code nor a violation
of any statutory scheme. 53 The majority dismissed Justice Pome-
roy's conclusion that the delegation of school board power was in-
consistent/in conflict with the Public School Code as a "nebulous
appea[l] to the necessity of maintaining 'the best and most effi-
cient school system possible.' "' The court's statement that it had
"examined the statutory scheme and concluded that there is no
inconsistency"'' 5 and its conclusion that the collective bargaining
requirement of "just cause" for discipline of a teacher did not in-
fringe on the school board's prerogative to adopt and enforce regula-
tions regarding teacher conduct, 56 may indicate that the inquiry to
determine if a "violation" exists encompasses the inquiry into in-
consistency/conflict.
The "in violation of" inquiry is a restrictive test-more precise
and objective than the other two inquiries, thus narrowing the
court's inquiry solely to determine if there exists a prima facie viola-
tion. A challenged item found non-violative under this inquiry will
necessarily be found consistent or not in conflict with a given statu-
tory scheme. Since the stated purpose of Act 195 is to encourage
collective bargaining, the logical effect of such a single inquiry is to
expand the scope of legally bargainable items.
151. 346 A.2d at 36.
152. Id. at 45 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 38-39 n.6, 40-41.
154. Id. at 42-43 n.17.
155. Id. at 38-39 n.6.
156. Id. at 40-41.
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The majority concluded that the existence of an arbitration proce-
dure did not restrict the substantive grounds for dismissal of a non-
tenured teacher.' 7 The court's decision in Local 3, AFT was consis-
tent with its decision in State College. The court reiterated the view
that Act 195 "repudiated" the "traditional concept of the sanctity
of managerial prerogatives in the public sector"'' 8 and again de-
clined to decide the bargainability of specific items, leaving to the
appropriate third party the determination, in the first instance, of
the merits of the contending parties' claims.5 9 In addition, the court
adopted a restrictive interpretation of section 703.
The true significance of State College and Local 3, AFT lies in the
fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not reach the sub-
stantive merits of the specific items presented for resolution. The
court's remand of the twenty-one items in State College to the
PLRB for reassessment'6 ° and its parallel decision in Local 3, AFT
to leave to an arbitrator the determination of the merits of the
parties' claims,' 6' coupled with the court's decision to opt for a case-
by-case analysis in order to develop general principles for resolution
of such conflicts, indicate that the court will leave to the PLRB the
resolution of specific items that arise in connection with attempts
to determine the scope of collective bargaining in public educa-
tion. 12 The court's decision to leave the resolution of disputed is-
sues to the PLRB represents judicial recognition of the legislative
intent in Act 195,63 the expertise of the PLRB in such cases, and
the PLRB's rather consistent pattern of decision-making'64 under
Act 195.
157. Id. at 42 n.17.
158. Id. at 39. See also Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School
Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 267 (Pa. 1975).
159. The court's unwillingness in Local 3, AFT to construe the collective bargaining
agreement since that was a question for the arbitrator in the first instance, 346 A.2d at 41
n.13, parallelled the same court's refusal in State College to determine whether the twenty-
one items at issue were in fact bargainable, that matter being left to the expertise of the PLRB
in the first instance. The twenty-one items in State College were only listed by the court in a
footnote and were never considered on the merits, i.e., subjected to the balancing test.
160. 337 A.2d at 270. There is no subsequent history as to any PLRB action on the
remanded twenty-one items.
161. 346 A.2d at 41 n.13.
162. The court in State College stated that "it is the duty of the [Pennsylvania Labor
Relations] Board in the first instance" to apply the balancing test in line with the court's
general principles of interpretation. 337 A.2d at 268 (emphasis added).
163. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.501, .1501-1502 (Supp. 1975) provide that recourse
shall be made in the first instance to the PLRB.
164. The only break in the new PLRB's (cf. note 101 supra) consistent interpretation of
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F. Administrative Interpretation
As teachers and school boards have sought to determine the par-
ameters of the scope of collective bargaining under Act 195, the
number of cases that have been presented to the PLRB for resolu-
tion has increased. 6 - A study of these decisions indicates that two
lines of cases have developed-one dealing with the determination
of the bargainability of specific items, and the second with the
purported conflict between Act 195 and the Public School Code of
1949.
In Canon-McMillan School Board, "' the PLRB found a duty in
the collective bargaining provisions of Act 195 occurred during the interval between the
commonwealth court's reversal of the Board's decision in State College (June 6, 1973) and
the supreme court's reversal of that decision (April 17, 1975).
165. The large number of PLRB cases involving schools/school boards/teacher associa-
tions is indicated in the following chart:
Chart 9 - PLRB Decisions
REPORTED PLRB OPINIONS
INVOLVING SCHOOLS/SCHOOL
DISTRICTs/TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS*TOTAL NUMBERt OF
REPORTED PLRB
YEAR OPINIONS NUMBER PERCENTAGE
1971 137 82 60%
1972 110 39 35%
1973 205 83 40%
1974 172 77 45%
1975 200 91 45%
Source: 1-6 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. (1971-75).
*Included iI the totals are vocational-technical schools and non-public schools. Excluded
from the totals are post-secondary and pre-primary educational institutions.
It should be noted that not all cases involving a school district also involved a teacher
association (although this has generally been so); school support personnel (e.g., teacher
aides, bus drivers) have, on occasion, been the opposing party.
166. 1 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 83 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1971), aff'd, 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 22
(Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972).
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the school board to bargain over compensation for teachers' extra-
curricular duties. The PLRB ruled that while a school board retains
the right to direct matters relating to its functions and programs,
once a decision is made by a school board to offer an extra program
or activity that involves extracurricular duties on the part of teach-
ers, the board must bargain over the wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment incident thereto. The PLRB's reiter-
ation of the same conclusion in two subsequent cases"7 appears to
have settled that particular issue.
The difficulty in predicting the parameters of the scope of collec-
tive bargaining was soon evidenced by two PLRB decisions issued
on the same day. In the first, Nazareth Area Education
Association,6 8 the Board ruled that teacher preparation time was
not an appropriate subject for mandatory bargaining. While such a
decision, standing alone, might have heralded a shift from the
Board's heretofore expansive reading of section 701, such was not so,
in light of the second case decided that day, Richland School
District.'69 The significance of the second case lay in the fact that
the Board, in an apparent attempt to clarify an already confused
situation and to provide guidelines to aid both teacher associations
and school boards in future collective bargaining negotiations,
enunciated a new standard for determining what is a mandatory
subject for bargaining and what falls within the "meet and discuss"
requirements. The test would turn on whether the item in dispute
"begin[s] at the management level and filter[s] down to the em-
ployes."' 7 If so, the item would not be subject to mandatory bar-
gaining; if the item "originate[s] closer to the employe level and
ha[s] a direct, immediate bearing on them,"'' the matter would
be mandatorily bargainable. Stating that the items at issue in
Richland-sick leave "bank," compensation for court and school
board appearances and "occupational diseases," family bereave-
ment leave, and procedural practices relating to teachers assaulted
167. Kiski School Dist., 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 66 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972) (school dis-
trict's duty to bargain on compensation for teachers' extracurricular duties); Cameron
County School Dist., 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 187 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972) (school district, while
not required to bargain over the establishment of extracurricular activity/duty, must bargain
on the impact of these established activities on wages, hours and conditions of employment).
168. 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 194 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972).
169. 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 195 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972).
170. Id. at 196-97.
171. Id. at 197.
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or sued-directly involved teachers, the Board concluded that they
were mandatorily bargainable.
It is unfortunate that the Board did not take the opportunity to
explain precisely how each of the issues in Richland qualified under
the "filter down" test 7 ' and why the test was not applied in
Nazareth. This announced test has not been utilized expressly by
the Board in any subsequent decisions involving the scope of collec-
tive bargaining between teachers and school boards. While the sub-
sequent commonwealth court decision in State College may account
for the PLRB's reluctance to utilize that test, that judicial deci-
sion-later reversed-cannot account for the PLRB's failure to use
the Richland test in cases that were decided prior to the common-
wealth court's decision.'73
The PLRB's expansive reading of the language of section 701 and
narrowing of the effect of section 702 as a limitation on the scope of
bargaining continued in Warwick School District,'74 wherein the
PLRB ordered the school board to bargain over the minimum start-
ing salary for teachers. Although this item impacted on the school
board's ability to select its personnel, the Board concluded that the
only effect establishment of minimum starting salaries would have
on the employer-employee relationship would be that the employer
would have a minimum limit beyond which it could not hire a new
employee. Since salaries are proper terms of employment, the estab-
lishment of a minimum salary pertaining to any employee position
was deemed a proper subject of collective bargaining under section
701.
It is necessary at this point to note the commonwealth court's
decision in State College so as to understand the impact of that
decision upon the PLRB's previous expansive reading of section 701
and restrictive reading of section 702. The commonwealth court
devised a two-step inquiry to determine bargainability of a disputed
item. First, an inquiry was to be made to determine if the item were
172. In applying the "filter down" test, the policy decision in each case would be that of
the board of school directors (e.g., whether or not to offer a program); yet the execution of
that policy necessarily has a direct and ifnmediate consequence on the hours, wages, terms
and working conditions of the teachers involved. Almost all school policies are decided at
some administrative level and must of necessity filter down to the teachers.
173. For an explanation as to why the "filter down" test has not been used by the PLRB
in cases that have been decided subsequent to the supreme court's decision in State College,
reversing the earlier commonwealth court decision, see text at page 469 infra.
174. 3 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 15 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1973).
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one of "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment" under section 701. If it were not, the inquiry need not proceed
further; if it were, the inquiry would proceed to the controlling ques-
tion: does the item involve "inherent managerial policy" under sec-
tion 702? If it did, bargaining would not be required.'75 Thus, any
item of "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment," if "affected" by a policy determination, would not be man-
datorily bargainable,7" but would be only "meet and discuss." Since
every "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment" issue is arguably "affected" by some managerial policy deter-
mination, the result was an interpretation of section 701 and section
702 that ran directly contrary to that employed by the PLRB.'77
The impact of this restrictive decision upon the PLRB's interpre-
tation of the collective bargaining provisions of Act 195 was evi-
denced dramatically in the second Richland School District ' case,
wherein the Board ruled that sick leave "bank," binding arbitra-
tion, notification of teaching schedules, and adoption of a school
calendar were not mandatorily bargainable items. The Board thus
reversed an earlier decision, involving the same school district, in
which it had held that a sick leave "bank" was a mandatorily bar-
gainable item; arbitration for reaching a successor contract was now
considered completely voluntary; and the Board deferred to the
commonwealth court's State College decision on the issues of timely
notice of teaching assignment and establishment of a school calen-
dar. 179
Although the PLRB's decision was affected by the commonwealth
court's State College decision, the Board's disinclination to adhere
to that restrictive decision, which was on appeal to the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, was evidenced in Williamsport Education
Association.'0 The PLRB avoided a decision on the merits of the
items in dispute'"' by ruling that the union's submission of items for
175. 9 Pa. Commw. at 238, 306 A.2d at 409-10.
176. Id. at 244, 306 A.2d at 412-13.
177. As to the supreme court's rejection of the commonwealth court's two-part test in
State College, see note 141 supra.
178. 4 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 2 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1974).
179. In light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reversal of the commonwealth court's
decision in State College, reliance on the PLRB's ruling on the last two items in Richland
(timely notice of teaching assignment and establishment of a school calendar), and possibly
also on the first item (sick leave "bank"), is misplaced.
180. 6 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 57 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1975).
181. The items at issue were not mentioned by the Board in its decision.
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negotiation labeled "non-negotiable" by the school district was not
an unfair labor practice under Act 195 where the union did not insist
upon bargaining about such items to the exclusion of all other bar-
gainable items. The Board thus avoided adherence to the common-
wealth court's restrictive interpretation of bargainable items that
would have resulted in a decision unfavorable to the teachers' asso-
ciation.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reversal of the common-
wealth court's decision in State College removed from the PLRB
the necessity to circumvent the commonwealth court's decision.
The two decisions of the PLRB since the supreme court's State
College decision reflect a return to an expansive reading of section
701 and a restrictive interpretation of section 702-which comports
with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the same
sections of Act 195.182
The second line of PLRB decisions-those dealing with the pur-
ported conflict between Act 195 and the Public School Code of
1949-has consistently reflected the PLRB's philosophy that there
is no repugnancy between those two statutory enactments since
their respective provisions are reconcilable and a consonant con-
struction of each enactment is achieved when the different subject
matter is considered." 3 The Public School Code governs the profes-
sional relationship between the school districts and its teachers; Act
195 governs only the labor relations between the teachers and the
school district-an entirely distinct and different phase of the rela-
tionship between the parties. Thus the Board has been able, in all
of the cases decided, to reach a conclusion that furthers the public
policy of Act 195 and is compatible with the School Code.
In the first case to present a purported conflict between Act 195
182. In Forest Hills School Dist., 6 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 250 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1975), the
Board ruled that a school board's unilateral revision of the school calendar, thereby deleting
four paid in-service days for which the parties had contracted, was an unfair labor practice,
notwithstanding the fact that the teachers' association did not object to the school board's
setting the school calendar, since paid in-service days are a condition of employment within
the scope of collective bargaining. In a second case, Dallastown Area Education Ass'n, 7
PA. Pue. EMP. REP. 1 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1976), the Board, citing the Supreme Court's decision
in State College, ruled that the teachers' association did not violate sections 701 and 702 by
insisting on unassigned preparation time and teaching-load being bargainable topics. The
Board stated that "even if" these items were prerogatives of management, they would not
be precluded from negotiation completely but would be permissibly bargainable.
183. Freeport Area School Dist., 3 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 181, 183 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1973).
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and the School Code,'" the Board stated that the Public School
Code and Act 195 "are actually supplementary. Just as the [school
district] must accept the rights and responsibilities granted by the
Public School Code, it must also accept the responsibilities and
obligations provided for in [Act 195].' ' 1 5 This same viewpoint was
reflected in Richland School District"6 where the Board, in rejecting
the school board's contention that the Code precluded bargaining
on certain items, stated that the Code sets only minimums-the
maximums may be established by collective bargaining. Thus a
school board "cannot hide behind the [Code] and attempt to avoid
its duties to bargain . ",.s7
The Board's philosophy, as outlined earlier, was forcefully stated
in Freeport Area School District, 81 where the Board ruled that an
arbitration award requiring a school district to discharge a teacher
for failure to maintain union membership pursuant to a contractual
"maintenance of membership" clause, did not violate the Public
School Code. Since the Code provides for the discharge of employees
who violate the "school laws of the Commonwealth"'89 and Act 195
is included among those school laws, 190 no conflict exists. 9'
This same philosophy of the Board was evident in its most recent
184. Upper Merion Area School Dist., 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 143 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972).
See also Upper Merion Area School Dist., 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 86 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972).
185. 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. at 145.
186. 2 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 195 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972).
187. Id. at 196.
188. 3 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 181 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1973).
189. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (1962).
190. Freeport Area School Dist., 3 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 181, 183 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1973).
191. The Board's philosophy was also evidenced in two cases involving teacher association
grievances. In Leechburg Area School Dist., 6 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 97, 98 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd.
1975), the Board dismissed as "sheer sophistry" the school district's argument that processing
of an entering teacher's salary schedule grievance was in conflict with section 1142 of the
Public School Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1142 (Supp. 1975), and concluded that the
Public School Code did not supersede the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
entered into by the school district.
In the second case, Union City Area School Dist., 6 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 194 (Pa. Lab. Rel.
Bd. 1975), the PLRB found that section 701 of Act 195 mandates, inter alia, the processing
of a union grievance that arises under a collective bargaining agreement, notwithstanding the
school board's argument that section 511 of the Public School Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §
5-511 (1962), renders the source of payment for school-dance chaperones a matter of inherent
managerial policy. In Union City, the Board relied upon its previous decision in Freedom Area
School Dist., 6 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 40 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1975), wherein it had ruled that a
school district's refusal to submit to arbitration a grievance, filed on behalf of a teacher's
widow claiming insurance benefits under a collective bargaining agreement, violated the
school district's duty to bargain regarding grievances arising from contractual interpretation.
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decision involving the Public School Code, Oxford Board of School
Directors,'92 wherein it held that section 703 of Act 195 did not
prevent implementation of an arbitration provision of a collective
bargaining agreement, notwithstanding the school board's claim
that permitting an arbitrator to decide upon the discharge of a
teacher would constitute a violation of section 1123 of the Public
School Code.'93 The Board determined that the identical issue had
been disposed of by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Local 3,
AFT.1'9
IV. THE FUTURE OF TEACHER-SCHOOL BOARD COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
From the foregoing, it is evident that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decisions have resolved certain major questions relating to
the scope of collective bargaining in public education and have es-
tablished guidelines to aid the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
and the lower courts in their handling of disputed items under the
collective bargaining provisions of Act 195. The following conclu-
sions as to the future of teacher-school board collective bargaining
may be drawn.
In light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decisions, courts
should read Act 195 as requiring, under the provisions of section 701,
the negotiation of all subjects directly related to "wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment," and as adding the re-
quirement to "meet and discuss" on matters of inherent managerial
policy which impact on wages, hours and terms or conditions of
employment. The determination of which matters more directly
relate to wages, hours and employment conditions than to manage-
rial policy must be made by a case-by-case analysis. Not infre-
quently, an item may not be easily classified as a section 701 item
192. 7 PA. PUB. EMP. REP. 19 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1976).
193. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1123 (Supp. 1975).
194. The scope of discussion in the present comment has been restricted solely to cases
involving school boards and teacher associations. It should be noted, however, that additional
relevant cases, within the general framework of public education, do exist involving non-
teacher associations. See, e.g., McKeesport Area School Dist., 6 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 153 (Pa.
Lab. Rel. Bd. 1975) (school bus drivers); Reynolds School Bd., 3 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 228 (Pa.
Lab. Rel. Bd. 1973) (secretaries, teacher aides, and custodians); Mars Area School Dist., 3
Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 163 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1973) (teacher aides), rev'd, 5 Pa. Pub. Emp.
Rep. 43 (C.P. Butler Co. 1974), aff'd, 344 A.2d 284 (Pa. Commw. 1975).
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or a section 702 item. In determining the appropriate classification,
one should begin with the basic premise that the passage of Act 195
was intended to afford teachers meaningful access to the bargaining
table to negotiate items fundamental to their jobs.'95 In most cases,
this premise will lead to the inclusion of the item as a mandatorily
bargainable item under section 701.
The discernible pattern in the area of collective bargaining in
public education is that there is and will continue to be an expan-
sion of the scope of bargainable subjects"'9 -in line with the supreme
court's and the PLRB's expansive interpretations of the language
governing the scope of bargaining in section 701.
Section 702 will be construed narrowly, as an additional require-
ment imposed upon the public employer, rather than as a broad
limitation on the scope of bargaining. While section 702 permits the
school board to retain the unquestioned right to decide, in the first
instance, matters of policy which properly come before it, section
702 also requires the public employer to "meet and discuss" on
policy questions which have an impact on wages, hours and working
conditions. When, however, the public employer decides upon im-
plementing a particular policy matter, and the implementation of
that matter directly relates to the wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment of its employees, section 701 requires that
the employer submit the matter to collective bargaining.'97 Thus a
distinction exists between the initial decision to provide a specific
program, which the school board has the unilateral power to make,
and the implementation of the decision, which must be bargained
about.
The Public School Code of 1949 is to be read to accommodate the
195. It should be kept in mind that the public interest, even as defined by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, is not always served by finding that every doubtful item be decided
against the public employees' section 701 rights.
196. As to the expanded scope of interpretation at the judicial level, see text accompany-
ing notes 90-164 supra; as to the expanded scope of interpretation at the administrative level,
see text accompanying notes 165-94 supra.
197. See, e.g., Canon-McMillan School Bd., 1 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 83 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd.
1971), wherein the Board stated:
It is true that the [school board] is not required to bargain over matters of inherent
managerial policy . . . . However, once they have made a decision to include . . .
functions and/or programs as part of the school program . . . then the . . . activities





purpose of Act 195 to encourage collective bargaining and settle
labor disputes in a peaceful manner. The legislature was fully aware
of the existence of the School Code when Act 195 was enacted.'
Both, therefore, must be read as an integrated whole. In none of the
decided cases have the provisions of the School Code been found to
restrict the scope of collective bargaining. Neither a judicial nor an
administrative finding of conflict between Act 195 and the Public
School Code should be anticipated inasmuch as both the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court and the PLRB view the Code as providing
minimum standards which do not prohibit bargaining in those
areas.
Act 195 is a clear departure from prior case and statutory law and
from the Public School Code. Almost all judicial decisions setting
forth the policy responsibilities of school boards predate the enact-
ment of Act 195. Since previous employer-employee relationships
were dramatically altered with the passage of Act 195, prior case law
resolving school board responsibilities is generally inapplicable in
interpreting the new relationships which come into play under Act
195.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's balancing approach, in an
area of statutory ambiguity, faithfully maintains the legislature's
accommodation of collective bargaining with school board discre-
tion. Such an approach should minimize labor unrest because it will
directly inquire into those factors that create bargaining impasses.
Likewise, it should preserve school board powers in those areas in
which the boards must serve and respond to student needs. The
court's unwillingness to formulate a rule clearly favoring one provi-
sion of Act 195 (or one party) over the other leaves open a wide range
of problems which the PLRB and the courts must resolve by apply-
ing, to diverse fact situations, a balancing of interests in the light
of the overall purpose of the Act. Utilization of a balancing approach
based on extensive factfinding does have a drawback, however; it
198. A proposed recodification of the Public School Code of 1949, containing extensive
changes, is currently pending before the Pennsylvania General Assembly. Should enactment
of a recodified Public School Code occur, the question will arise as to the precise scope of
school board managerial authority under a new Code-in light of Act 195's alteration of
inherent school board authority under the 1949 Code and in light of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's expansive interpretation of the language governing the scope of collective
bargaining in Act 195. Enactment of a new Public School Code is certain to generate new
litigation respecting the relationship of a new School Code with the collective bargaining
provisions of Act 195.
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does not lend itself to situations in which a speedy decision is
needed. In addition, it may result in different scopes of bargaining
in different school districts. NQnuniformity is a necessary result
since individual school boards and teacher associations may, at cer-
tain times, face peculiar exigencies and employment conditions. A
fair disposition of bargainability disputes requires the factfinder to
take these circumstances into consideration.
The PLRB's "filter down" test, in light of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's adoption of a balancing test in State College, will not
be utilizable for resolution of future disputes concerning the bar-
gainability of disputed items between teachers and school districts.
A test which is grounded upon the school board's inherent manage-
rial decision-making power, the effects of which may "filter down"
to teachers, does not comport with the supreme court's balancing
test which is grounded upon the impact of an item on a teacher's
interest in wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. The "filter down" test focuses initially upon the school
board's managerial prerogatives, whereas the supreme court's test
focuses initially on the teacher's interest. The difference between
the two tests is significant since the initial focus often determines
the ultimate decision as to bargainability of an item. Hence, the
PLRB's resurrection and application of a "filter down" test, in any
form, should not occur.
While there may be frustration with what appears to be the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's avoidance of specific substantive issues,
the court's stance does encourage settlements tailored to the needs
of the particular community. Such a stance promotes local initiative
and guards against the danger of local inertia in passively awaiting
and accepting judicially imposed decisions. This judicial recogni-
tion of the individuality of each school district and its relationship
with its teachers is consonant with the traditional Pennsylvania
treatment of its school districts. As a practical matter some school
districts may be willing to acquiesce in certain contractual provi-
sions because they are unimportant to that particular school dis-
trict. Some school districts in the interest of reaching an agreement
may acquiesce in the negotiation of certain policy items simply
because they are unwilling to become involved in long, expensive
and acrimonious legal proceedings. The same, of course, may be
said of teachers with respect to issues that they consider bargaina-
ble. Thus, the scope of bargaining issue will be of a different magni-
1976
Duquesne Law Review
tude in different school districts in the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania. That different patterns will emerge in Pennsylvania's school
districts is exemplified by the PLRB's statement, contained in its
brief before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in State College, that
since the implementation of Act 195 "hundreds of school districts
have collectively bargained on many of the items raised in [State
College] and incorporated agreements thereon into written con-
tracts . . . ."I"
The very nature of the collective bargaining process alters the
once-unilateral decision-making power of school boards. Thus some
management flexibility is necessarily eliminated in the interest of
harmonious employment relations. However, since section 701 spe-
cifically provides that the collective bargaining process "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession," a school board cannot equate collective bargaining
with destruction of its discretion. Such a viewpoint is unfounded
both in the reality of actual practice as well as in the law itself. It
is based on a misinterpretation of collective bargaining which
equates negotiation of an item with complete abrogation of a school
board's control over that item. 00
Agreement by some school districts to bargain over one or more
policy items cannot be used to force other school districts to recog-
nize an obligation to bargain, until litigation ensues and a PLRB
decision ordering such bargaining is forthcoming. Nonetheless, if
the practice of a school district is currently out of line with the
practices of most school districts-especially with those of sur-
199. Brief for Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board at 94, Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 337 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975). To determine current negotia-
tion practices as evidenced by the negotiated provisions of current teacher-school board
collective bargaining agreements, see the current collective bargaining agreements for each
school district in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, on file with the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
200. See Seitz, School Board Authority and the Right of Public School Teachers to Nego-
tiate-A Legal Analysis, 22 VAND. L. REV. 239 (1969), wherein he states:
Good faith collective negotiations require recognition by both parties, not merely for-
mal but real, that bargaining is a shared process in which each party has a right to
play an active role. Each party balances what is desired against known costs of unre-
solved disagreement. These costs on the one side may be such things as loss of compe-
tent employees and the fostering of a general low morale, and on the other side the
loss of community support if unreasonable demands are made.
Id. at 253. The Pennsylvania School Boards Association, however, urges school boards not to




rounding school districts-the exclusion of an item from bargaining
may promote teacher unrest. The importance which teachers may
place on this item may be evidenced from their willingness to trade
off possible gains in other bargainable areas for concessions regard-
ing this particular item. On the other hand, if the situation in a
school district with respect to an item is comparable to that existing
in other school districts, the exclusion of that item from bargaining
has less likelihood of precipitating substantial teacher unrest.
Neither the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board nor the courts
appear to assume that the language of the request for bargaining is
controlling regardless of the nature of the issue. Indeed, if the issue,
and the resultant decision, were to turn only upon a matter of se-
mantics, there would be no real guidance to school boards and
teacher associations on what issues they may expect to bargain, and
multiple court suits would occur to determine whether the "magic
words" had been used in each case or whether such words veiled an
altogether different issue. To avoid being confronted with
continuous litigation seeking to define the proper scope of collective
bargaining, the courts and the PLRB do not appear to subscribe to
a theory of labor relations that permits negotiability to stand or fall
on the wording of the request. Thus the focus is properly upon the
nature of the issue which is sought to be bargained.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that the resolution
of disputed items is for the PLRB in the first instance. Although the
courts function as final arbiters, the scope of review on an appeal
taken from a PLRB decision and order, as established by Act 195,
is quite narrow. 0' The Board's findings are not to be disturbed upon
review where they are supported by substantial and legally credible
evidence. The court may not substitute its views for those of the
Board, legally charged with utilizing its expertise in resolving spe-
cialized controversies. Thus, so long as the Board's conclusions are
reasonable and not capricious, they must stand, and a court may
not supplant the Board's decisions with its own viewpoint, even
though the court would have made a different determination had
the matter been de novo.
An alternative to case-by-case clarification of the scope of collec-
tive bargaining by administrative decision-making and court inter-
pretation would be legislative action to define with greater specific-
201. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1501-.1502 (Supp. 1975).
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ity the provisions of sections 701, 702, and 703.02 However, a statu-
tory change in the present scope of bargaining provisions of Act 195
is unlikely. A committee of the Pennsylvania General Assembly,
after hearings concerning the desirability of change in Act 195, re-
cently concluded that no statutory change in the present scope of
bargaining sections was desirable.2 3 There would be an inherent
danger in attempting such an "end run" around the bargaining
table and/or the existing processes for resolution of issues. While
both teacher associations and school boards unquestionably have
legislative influence, an indiscriminate use of that influence may
restrict collective bargaining in subsequent negotiations; the
possibility of utilizing legislative channels to attain benefits denied
to either group in negotiations is bound to have an unfavorable
impact on the negotiating process.20 4
The supreme court's definition of the public interest as "the effec-
tive and efficient operation of public employment ' 25 represents a
conscious rejection by the court of the heretofore existing equation
of the public interest with preservation of inherent managerial pol-
icy and equation of teachers' concerns with a purely private interest.
The effect of such a change is to eliminate the favored position
which school boards had enjoyed under the guise of advancing the
"public interest" and to create a relative equality between the two
parties which may achieve the constructive relationship between
teacher associations and school boards that the legislature
envisioned. Professional negotiations between teacher associations
and school boards, when developed to a proper level of sophistica-
tion in both groups, should best effectuate the legislative intent that
Act 195 "promote orderly and constructive relationships between all
public employers and their employes. '2 1° Such a development will
202. See Comment, The Public Employe Relations Act, supra note 14, at 83.
203. 1975 Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. No. 587 at B-7, E-5 (Jan. 6, 1975). The legislators'
conclusion is not without reason inasmuch as no guarantee exists that any public employee
act, no matter how sophisticated or reasoned, would admit of no variant interpretations as
specific issues arose. Also, the courts' interpretations of Act 195 apparently are not of such
variance from what the committee perceived the legislative intent to be in Act 195 as to
warrant additional legislation.
204. 3 LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS SERVICE NEWSLETTER No. 2, Feb. 1972, at 4, cited
in Siegel & Kainen, Political Forces in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 21 CATH. U.L.
REV. 481, 584-85 (1972).
205. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Rd. v. State College Area School Dist., 337 A.2d 262,
267 (Pa. 1975).
206. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1975).
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provide the opportunity for both parties to accomplish their com-
mon objective-quality education for the children of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania.
JOHN C. BATES

